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Abstract 
  The growth of Chinese exports both in volume and in market share over the past 
two decades is a singular event in the history of world trade.  Using data from 1995-2005, 
we document this growth in a variety of ways.  First, we show that the expanded trade is 
pervasive.  Virtually every country in the world has seen China claim a larger share of its 
import market.  Then, we use Constant Market Share (CMS) analysis to try to determine 
which country or countries have lost market share as China’s trade has grown.  Contrary 
to much discussion in the popular press, we find strong evidence that other developing 
countries have not seen export shares fall as a result of China’s gains.  Rather, our results 
suggest that China’s share growth has come largely at the expense of exporters based in 
Japan and the United States.  We then turn to an attempt to identify the factor or factors 
responsible for export growth.  Using a large set of data disaggregated at the 5-digit SITC 
level on trade among 75 countries we look at changes over the period in import unit 
values.  We find that China has maintained a relatively constant price advantage over U.S. 
and Japanese exports.  In addition, we use 3-digit level data to estimate a heterogeneous-
firm model that examines the probability of successful entry by a firm into an export 
market.  We find strong evidence that the growth of Chinese exports is due to entry by 
new firms within any sectors, probably engendered by firm level technological advance 
or entry of foreign firms that have begun to produce in and export from China.   
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1. Introduction 
 
  Over the past two decades the Chinese economy has grown at a remarkable pace.  
According to the Penn World Tables, between 1995 and 2007 Chinese real GDP grew at 
an average annual rate of more than 10%.  Per capita real GDP rose by 250% over this 
period.
1    One  of  the  leading  factors  driving  this  economic  growth  has  been   the 
extraordinary  performance  of  Chinese  exports .    According  to  the  World  Trade 
Organization (WTO), in 2008 China ranked second in exports to the world market with 
merchandise export sales of $1.4 trillion and a world market share of 8.9%.   In 1998, 
China had less than 2% of the world market.   Twenty years earlier, China’s share was 
essentially  zero.  As  China’s  share  of  world  exports  has  grown,  it  has  come  under 
increasing pressure to allow its currency to appreciate; often the criticism of its exchange 
rate practices includes charges that other developing and emerging market economies 
have borne the brunt in terms of lost export markets.
2 
  The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of Chinese export growth over 
the period when its share of world exports rose most rapidly, the years 1995-2005.  We 
provide  detail  on  the  commodity  composition  of  Chinese  exports  and  how  this 
composition has changed.  We also discuss some aspects of the geographic pattern of 
Chinese trade.  In addition,  a fundamental contribution of this paper is that  we provide 
considerable evidence that the principal exporting countries that have lost market share to 
China are Japan and the United States. 
                                                 
1 These numbers use China Version 2 data from the PWT6.3 data set.  See “What is New in PWT 6.3?” 
link on the Penn World Tables site, http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php, for a discussion of 
the differences between this version of Chinese data and official Chinese data. 
2 See, for instance, Arvin Subramanian, “Who Pays for the Weak Renminbi?”, 11 February 2010, Vox 
Front Page, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4604.  
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  We  then  turn  to  a  discussion  of  what  factors  have  been  most  important  in 
explaining  Chinese  export  growth.    We  show  that  export  price  advantages  are  an 
important part of the story, and provide evidence that these advantages cover a broad 
range of differentiated products.   We then expand and estimate a model of the firm level 
decision to export first developed by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008).  Our paper 
represents one of the first attempts to apply and estimate this model using product level 
data.
3  We find strong evidence that Chinese export expansion over this period is du e to 
the entry of new firms probably engendered by firm level technological advance  and/or 
the entry of foreign firms that have begun to produce in and export from China.  
  The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2 we present an overview of 
Chinese trade expansion.  In section 3 we discuss Constant Market Share (CMS) analysis, 
an empirical technique that provides a method for studying changes in export market 
shares.  In section 4, we apply CMS to study trade patterns among a sample of  75 
countries over the period 1995 -2005 in  commodity trade disaggregated at the 5 -digit 
SITC level.  In section 5, we expand our analysis by focusing on export behavior across 
industries and in individual export markets.  In section 6 we report estimates of import  
unit values  as well as estimates from our expanded version of the  Helpman-Melitz-
Rubinstein model.  Section 7 offers our conclusions.  
 2.  An Overview of Chinese Export Performance  
Figure 1 provides a time series plot of world export shares for five of the world’s 
leading exporting countries, Germany, China, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States.  As the figure shows, since the end of World War II, only Germany has seen as 
                                                 
3 Manova (2010) is another study that uses disaggregated data in the context of this model.  
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rapid and as large a rise in world export share as China.  In the eleven year span from 
1948 to  1958, Germany’s share of world  exports rose from 1.3% to 10.3%, roughly 
matching  in  both  magnitude  and  duration  China’s  performance.    However  there  are 
several major differences between the two.  First, Germany’s growth almost certainly 
represented a return for that country to a market position similar to the one that it had 
held prior to the war era.  Second, at the time of Germany’s significant growth there were 
far  fewer  major  exporters  competing  for  market  share.    For  instance,  at  the  time  of 
Germany’s growth the combined world export share of the countries now known as the 
Asian NICs (Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) was virtually zero.  In contrast, 
since at least the onset of the industrial revolution and prior to the 1990s, China had never 
held a significant share of world trade.  And, China’s export growth came only slightly 
after significant growth by the NICs and simultaneously with major growth by several 
other countries that along with China make up the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, and India), all 
of whom now also hold large shares of the world market. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Like all major exporting countries, China has a market presence in virtually every 
country in the world; this presence has grown in almost every market in recent years. 
Using data from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics we calculated aggregate exporter 
market shares in 80 countries and 1 territory (Hong Kong), from all parts of the world.
4  
Several interesting patterns emerge from this exercise.  First, the global extent of China’s 
trade expanded significantly between 1995 and 2005.  By 2005, China had at least 2% of 
                                                 
4 These countries were chosen from those studied in Cassing and Husted (2004).  See their Table 6A.1. Ten 
countries, all from low income countries from Asia and Africa, were excluded due to lack of data.  
Complete results provided on request.  
  6 
the  market  in  all  but  three  of  these  countries.
5   Moreover, market share growth was 
pervasive; over the 1995-2005 period China’s market share grew in all of these markets 
except one.
6  In many cases, especially in South America, Africa, and smaller European 
countries, shares were essentially zero prior to 1995.   Table 1 provides some additional 
summary statistics. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
According  to  the  table,  geography  is  clearly  important  for  China’s  trade.    Its 
highest shares are in Asia where among the sample countries it had an average share of 
12.8%.  Its highest market share among all the Asian countries in the sample stood at 
45%.
7   Its next highest average regional market share was in North America; this 
included 13% of all U.S. merchandise imports in 2005.  On average, China’s smallest 
regional market penetration was in Europe, where its average national market share in 
2005 was only 4.1%.  
As China’s export market share has grown in recent years, it has changed the mix 
of goods it supplies to these markets.  In order to illustrate this change in the commodity 
composition of trade, we restrict our attention to exports of differentiated manufactured 
products  disaggregated  at  the  5-digit  SITC  level.
8   Due to missing data for several 
African countries, in much of what follows we analyze data from a subset of seventy five 
                                                 
5 The  exceptions  are Burkina Faso (1.6%), Portugal (1.2%), and Switzerland (1.4%).  
6 The country where China’s export share fell was Malawi.  This fall was due in part to an abnormally high 
(for the time) level of China’s exports to Malawi in 1995.  
7 This was China’s share of Hong Kong’s market.  Among the other Asian countries in this sample China 
had more than 20 % of Japan’s market in 2005 and more than 10% of the export markets of Bangladesh, 
Korea, Pakistan, Singapore, and Sri Lanka. 
8 With one minor exception, the data we use are imports and are taken from the United Nations Commodity 
Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade).  
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countries.
9  Our sample includes countries from every continent and includes countries at 
various standards of living ; slightly more than  one-third  the countries chosen in our 
sample are classified by the World Bank as high income countries.  In 2005, the countries 
used in our analysis  accounted for  87% of total world imports.  Trade among these 
countries accounted for a majority of all world merchandise trade in each of the two years 
in our sample. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 provides detail on the composition of Chinese exports in 1995 and 2005  
to our sample of markets as well as the countries identified as developing countries across 
broad categories of goods.
10  Also included in the table is China’s portion of total world 
exports at the 1-digit level (SITC Rev.3) in 1995 and 2005.  As the table shows, Chinese 
exports have been centered in manufactures for some time.  In 1995, 86% of Chinese 
exports to our sample countries came from industries 5-9.  By 2005, that share had risen 
to almost 94% of total exports.  Traditionally, Chinese exports have been concentrated in 
Miscellaneous  Manufactured  Articles  (Industry  8).    This  sector  includes  many  labor 
intensive  manufactured  products  such  as  clothing,  footwear,  and  toys,  items  long 
identified as characteristic examples of Chinese exports.  Twenty five percent of Chinese 
                                                 
9 In addition to China, we use the following countries:  (Africa) Algeria, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Benin, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Tunisia, Uganda, and Tanzania; (Asia and Pacific) Australia, Bangladesh, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, India, Singapore, and 
Thailand; (Europe) Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom; (Middle East) 
Israel, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey; (North America) Canada, Mexico, and USA; 
(Central & South America) Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. All of these countries were 
included in the 81 countries that make up the sample for Table 1. The six countries that we were forced to 
drop from the sample are Brunei, Fiji, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and the United Arab 
Emirates. Since import data for 1995 are not available for six countries, we use the closest years from 1995: 
Benin (1998), Gabon (1996), Ghana (1996), Mali (1996), Senegal (1996), and Guyana (1997).  
10 Developing countries are those not classified as being a High Income Country by the World Bank in its 
2009 World Development Report.  
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exports to our sample countries in 2005 came from this sector.  However, this share had 
stood at 37% of total exports to these markets in 1995.  Instead, in recent years, the share 
of  Chinese  exports  of  more  sophisticated  manufactures  has  risen  substantially  with 
exports  in  Machinery  and  Transport  Equipment  (Industry  7)  more  than  doubling  to 
almost 48% of its exports to the sample markets and 52% of its sales to the developing 
country markets in the sample in 2005.   
China’s world market shares changes over this period followed the transformation 
described above.  Between 1995 and 2005, its share of Industry 7 exports to the world 
increased  by  a  factor  of  four,  while  its  Industry  8  market  share  increased  by  ten 
percentage points.  We are not the first to point out the recent growth in the sophistication 
of Chinese exports.  Rodrik (2006) calculates that by 2002 China had an export bundle 
“of a country with an income per-capita level three times higher than China’s”.
11  In a 
related study, Schott (2008) focuses on Chinese exports to the United States.  He finds 
that the composition of this export bundle “increasingly overlaps with that of the world’s 
most developed economies”.
12  
  The data in  Tables 1 and 2 document the growth  of Chinese exports and the 
change in the sectoral composition of these goods over the period 1995-2005.  Clearly, 
the rapid growth of China in the world market has had market share implications for 
other exporting nations.  A number of papers have focused on various aspects of the 
recent growth of Chinese exports on global competition.   
One focus of attention has been on whether the growth has occurred due to an 
expansion of the variety of goods exported (the extensive margin) or a growth in trade of 
                                                 
11 Rodrik (2006) pg. 4. 
12 Schott (2008) pg. 34.  
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existing varieties (intensive margin).  Broda and Weinstein (2006) find that over the last 
quarter of the twentieth century roughly 30% of U.S. import growth was at the extensive 
margin,  with  China  the  largest  contributor.  However,  using  Chinese  export  data 
disaggregated at the HS-8 level, Amiti and Freund (2010) report that most of Chinese 
export growth  to  the world  between 1997 and  2005 was  in  existing varieties.    Most 
recently, Manova and Zhang (2009) using firm level data on Chinese trading firms find 
that a relatively few large firms are responsible for substantial share of exports; these 
firms export to many markets, and many are foreign owned.   
One focus of our paper is on which other exporting countries are losing foreign 
markets  due  to  the  rise  of  China.    Other  papers  have  also  attempted  to  address  this 
question.  Using a gravity model, Hanson and Robertson (2010) study ten developing 
countries they identify as potential losers to Chinese competition.  However, they find 
Chinese export expansion over the 1995-2005 period has had only a modest negative 
impact on the exports of these other countries.  In an earlier study, Ahearne et al (2003) 
use VAR analysis to see if Chinese exports reduce the exports of other Asian economies.  
They find instead a positive correlation between exports from these two sources.  These 
findings along with the industry classifications of Chinese exports  suggest that major 
competing countries with China in world export markets may be developed rather than 
developing countries.  In the remainder of this paper, we try to identify which countries 
have lost share and to provide a measure of the size of the losses. We also focus on the 
growth of Chinese exports at broad industry levels and in individual export markets.  We 
turn now to describe the modeling strategy we employ to answer these questions. 
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3.   Market Shares Methodology 
Constant  Market  Share  (CMS)  analysis  has  long  been  used  to  study  export 
performance.
13  This modeling approach  treats as a norm of behavior  that a country’s 
market share will remain constant over time.  If instead it changes, that must be due to 
changes  in  competitiveness  or  changes  in  demand  from  the  world  as  a  whole  or  in 
individual markets.  The analysis then proceeds to decompose export share changes in 
order to identify these factors.  In the 1950s and 1960s, CMS was a popular tool of 
analysis.  In a well known paper, however, Richardson (1971) criticized its use, arguing 
that the signs and magnitudes of the measured effects depend upon in part on the methods 
used in their calculation.   
Taking these criticisms into account, Fagerberg and Sollie (1987) (hereafter FS) 
have proposed several refinements to traditional CMS analysis.  These include improved 
theoretical  consistency  via  the  use  of  Laspeyres  weights  throughout  and  an  explicit 
economic  interpretation  of  all  decomposed  terms.    They  have  also  extended  the 
traditional model to include two additional terms which measure the adaptability of the 
export sector of a country to changes in the commodity and national market composition 
of world exports.
14  We now turn to a brief derivation of their model.  
First, consider the change in exporters’ shares in each importer’s market.  We 
define the value of imports of product i from country k to l is defined as mi
kl.  The market 
share of country k (an exporter) in product i in market l (an importer) is 
(1)                                                     /
kl kl kl
i i i k a m m   . 
                                                 
13 See Leamer and Stern (1970) Chapter 7 for a derivation of the original model and the references therein 
for examples of its use.  
14 Irwin (1995) uses the FS approach to study changes in the export market share of Great Britain in the 
early 20
th century.  
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Product i’s share of country l’s total imports is defined as 
(2)                                                /
l kl kl
i i i k i k b m m    . 
Since the market share of country k is written as  
kl kl l
ii i M a b  , 
the change in country k’s share of market l between an initial year (time 0) and year t is 
0
kl kl kl
t M M M    . 
This equation can be rewritten as the sum of three terms: 
(3)                                           
kl kl kl kl
a b ab M M M M     . 
where  
(4)                                               00 ()
kl kl kl l
a it i i i M a a b      
(5)                                               00 ()
kl kl l l
b i it i i M a b b      
(6)                                          00 ( )( )
kl kl kl l l
ab it i it i i M a a b b       
Equation  (4)  is  the  effect  of  changes  in  the  market  share,  weighting  the  change  in  
exporter k’s share of product i exports by the initial share of the product in market l.  
Equation (5) is the effect of changes in the product composition of importer l, weighted 
by the initial share of the product from country k.  The final term, equation (6), is a 
residual term which can be written as 
(7)      
0.5 0.5 2 2
0 0 0 ( ) ( )
kl kl kl kl kl kl l l
ab ab it t i it i ii M r a a a a b b             
 where 
kl
ab r  is the correlation coefficient between the changes in market shares and the 
changes in product shares.  
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FS then extend the decomposition exercise from one market to the world market.  
The country l’s share of world imports is defined as: 
(8)                                         /
l kl kl
ii k i k l i c m m       
In this case, we can write the market share of county k in world market as 
                                                         
k kl l
l M M c  . 
The change in M
k between time 0 and time t is  
                                      
k k k k
m c mc
k k k k k
a b ab c mc
M M M M
M M M M M
    
     
 
where  
(9)                                           0 0 0 ()
k l kl kl l
a it i i li M c a a b        
(10)                                          0 0 0 ()
k l kl l l
b i it i li M c a b b        
(11)                                   0 0 0 ( )( )
k l kl kl l l
ab it i it i li M c a a b b         
(12)                                               00 ()
k kl l l
ct l M M c c      
(13)                                         00 ( )( )
k kl kl l l
mc t t l M M M c c       
Our  analysis  focuses  on  equations  (9) -(13);  following FS, each  can  be  interpreted  as  a 
separate factor that influences export performance. 
Equation  (9) is the market share effect.  This term captures the change in an 
exporter’s share of each product in each country, holding constant the initial commodity 
composition and the country distribution of world trade.  Thus, it captures the extent to 
which  an  exporter  gains  market  share  independent  of  changes  in  the  product  and 
destination pattern of world trade.  Equation (10) is the commodity composition effect.   
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The  commodity  composition  effect  measures  the  influence  of  the  changing  share  of 
products in world trade on an exporter’s overall share.  If, for instance, the structure of 
world imports changes towards more manufactured goods and away from agricultural 
products, the exporters of manufactured goods (agricultural goods) would see an increase 
(a decrease) in their market shares.  
Equation (11) is the commodity adaptation effect.  The commodity adaptation 
effect identifies whether the change in the structure of a country’s exports is correlated 
with changes in the commodity composition of world imports.  This number is zero if the 
country changes its export structure at the same rate as all countries exporting to the 
world market.  Equation (12) is the market composition effect.  This effect measures the 
influence of changes in the country demand pattern of world imports.  Thus, it identifies 
the countries that increase their world market share by selling their products heavily in 
expanding markets.  Finally, equation (13) is the market adaptation effect.  This effect 
captures  the  correlation  between  a  country’s  export  destinations  and  world  export 
destinations. 
4. Empirical Results: Aggregate Analysis 
For each country in our study, the change in market share of the world market is 
decomposed into the five effects discussed above.  The results for regional exports and a 
selected set of countries are given in Table 3.
15  The right-most column in table provides 
the overall percentage change in the  total sample export  market share  for each of the 
                                                 
15 We concentrate on 2001 5-digit exports of goods that Rauch (1999) and Hallak (2006, 2010) define as 
differentiated products at the 3-digit level.  Most of these products are from 1-digit SITC sectors of 5-8. 
Since there are gaps in 5-digit sub-products 673 and 676 (some types of iron and steel products), we 
exclude products from these two sectors.   
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regions  and  sample  countries  over  the  period  1995-2005.
16   The  other five columns 
represent different effects, corresponding to equations (9) to (13), and add up to the total 
change. 
        [Insert Table 3 about here] 
The first thing to note about the table is that for most countries in the study, overall 
export shares hardly changed over the sample period (see the last column).  This stability 
of trade shares is a stylized fact of trade patterns at the bilateral level first pointed out and 
analyzed by Cassing and Husted (2004 and 2009) in two related studies.   The principal 
exceptions to this pattern of export share stability over the sample period are China 
(+9.42 percentage points (pp)), European countries (-4.47 pp), Japan (-4.26 pp) and the 
United States (-3.33 pp).  These results clearly imply that the growth in Chinese export 
market share has come  largely at the expense of  exporters in developed countries, in 
particular Japan and  the  United States,  rather than exporters in  developing  countries.  
Other principal world exporters did experience somewhat smaller market share losses;  
each of the other G7 countries  in the table  saw market shares drop over this period, 
several by more than one percentage point .  We turn now to discuss  what factors have 
contributed to these changes in trade shares. 
First, according to the decomposition reported in the table, the market share effect 
appears to be responsible for most of the changes in export performance by the countries 
in our sample.  During the period from 1995 to 2005, the market share effect was strongly 
positive for China (+9.56 pp) and strongly negative for Japan (-4.45 pp) and the United 
States (-3.87 pp).  With few exceptions, the commodity composition effect, the market 
                                                 
16 Values for the countries not listed in Table 3 tended to be very small.  They are available on request.  
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composition effect, the commodity adaptation effect, and the market adaptation effect 
play only small roles in explaining the changes in world trade shares.  This is especially 
true for China, where each of these other factors appeared to have only small effects on 
the overall change in market share.  The fact that the market share effect played such an 
important  role  in  China’s  export  share  gain  is  consistent  with  Amiti  and  Freund’s 
findings that China’s export growth was largely at the intensive margin.
17  
Consistent with the findings of Hanson and Robertson, developing countries such 
as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Mexico did not lose their market shares in this 
period despite China’s export growth.  Indeed, all saw their shares rise, although by much 
smaller amounts than China’s increase.  Again, as was the case with China, Japan, and 
the  United  States,  the  market  share  effect  appears  to  have  been  the  primary  factor 
responsible for the change in total market share.  
Why, in particular, are market share losses to China concentrated in Japan and the 
United States?  One answer may be outsourcing by exporters in these two countries to 
firms in China.  As noted, without identifying the countries involved, Manova and Zhang 
(2009) report that “Chinese joint ventures and affiliates of foreign multinationals were 
responsible for fully 75%” of the increase in  China’s  trade flows  between 2003 and 
2005.
18  We have no way to identify which countries host the parent companies of these 
firms  although  there is considerable  evidence that Japanese firms m ay  be involved.  
Tomiura (2008) reports that in recent years  China has been the destination  country for 
more than half of all the outsourcing done by Japanese firms. 
                                                 
17 We explore this point in depth below. 
18 Manova and Zhang (2009) pg. 2.  
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Evidence that FDI may be responsible for lost U.S. export share is much less strong.  
Branstetter and Foley (2007) assert that U.S. FDI in China is only an extremely small 
portion of total U.S. FDI activity.  Moreover,  they argue that more than 90% of the 
production of U.S. affiliates in China is sold in China rather than exported to the United 
States  or  other  markets.    Thus,  for  the  United  States,  FDI  in  China  is  at  most  only 
responsible  for  a  share  decline  in  the  Chinese  market  although  we  have  no  way  to 
examine outsourcing between unaffiliated firms.  Instead, as we show below, a chief 
factor in explaining export market loss is a significant price advantage of Chinese exports 
across a large spectrum of products.  And, given that we measure import prices in dollars, 
Chinese exchange rate policy may possibly play a role.  
5. Empirical Results: Products and Markets 
We now turn our attention to an extended analysis of changes in market shares 
across various regions and industries.  To document further the nature of competition 
between  Chinese  exporters  and  exporters  from  other  countries,  we  focus  on  bilateral 
competition in each of the markets in our sample using first data on the aggregate of trade 
in the 2,001 5-digit differentiated products used to develop Table 3.   
Consider Figures 2-1 through 2-6.  In these, we compare Chinese export share 
changes from 1995 to 2005 (measured on the horizontal axis) vs. the export market share 
changes for six possible export competitors (measured on the vertical axis) in the 73 
remaining import markets in our sample.   
Figure 2-1 plots market share changes from 1995 to 2005 for China and the United 
States in 73 importer markets.  According to the figure the United States lost market 
share in all but eleven countries (most of these are African countries such as Tanzania),  
  17 
while China gained share in all 73 countries but Burundi.  Figure 2-2 plots the market 
share changes for China and Japan.  Similar to the United States, Japan lost market share 
in most countries in our sample, particularly in those in the Asian and Pacific regions. 
[Insert Figures 2-1 and 2-2 about here] 
Figures 2-3 and 2-4 provide the market share changes for Malaysia and Mexico, 
two of the countries which Hanson and Robertson considered as the potential competitors, 
each vis-à-vis China.  Perhaps surprisingly, but consistent with the Hanson-Robertson 
conclusions, there are no clear market losses for Malaysia and Mexico relative to China 
during the period.  Consider, for instance, the case of Malaysia.  Most of the observations 
in the Figure 2-3 lie in the positive quadrant, suggesting that over this period exporters 
from the two countries may not compete strongly in at least these third country markets.
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The data also suggest that Mexico and China do not compete strongly in third country 
markets.  As Figure 2-4 shows, there is essentially no correlation between market share 
changes in the two countries.  Indeed, Mexico’s export shares in most markets hardly 
changed over the decade, even as China’s shares rose across the board.  
[Insert Figures 2-3 and 2-4 about here] 
Finally in Figures 2-5 and 2-6 we diagram competition between China and two 
other countries, Germany and India.  Consider first Figure 2-5.  As the plot shows and as 
was the case with the United States and Japan, most of the observations are located in the 
lower quadrant of the diagram, suggesting that Germany also experienced market share 
losses in the face of Chinese competition.  Figure 2-6 provides detail on the relationship 
between China and India in third markets.  As the figure shows, the relationship between 
                                                 
19 This is also consistent with the results reported in Aherne et al (2003).  
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Indian and Chinese market share changes over the decade from 1995 to 2005 is very 
similar to that between Mexico and China.  Again there is little or no evidence of close 
competition between the exports of these countries in third country markets. 
[Insert Figures 2-5 and 2-6 about here] 
We turn now to focus on the major industrial sectors involved in the export market 
share changes detailed above.  Again, using data from our seventy five country sample, 
Table 4 provides further detail on market share changes for China, Japan, and the United 
States by region and industry.  In each of these regions for both SITC 1-digit industries 7 
(machinery  and  transport  equipment)  and  8  (miscellaneous  manufactures),  Chinese 
export  shares  rose  significantly,  with  gains  exceeding  10  percentage  points  in  most 
markets.  And, as the table shows, regardless of region and product Chinese market share 
gains came at the expense of other developed countries.  In many cases, the largest losses 
again were experienced by Japan and the United States. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
6. Further Empirics: Exports by Industry 
6.1 Unit Values of Chinese Export Goods 
We  have  shown  that  China  has  increased  its  share  of  world  exports,  and,  in 
particular, that the rise of China corresponds to market share losses by Japan and the 
United States.  Although we have documented the picture of the share change from 1995 
to 2005, we have not answered perhaps the most important question: is it possible to 
identify  which  factor  (or  factors)  has  (have)  been  most  important  in  contributing  to 
Chinese  export  growth?    Such  things  may  include  an  expansion  of  Chinese  firms  
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choosing to export, a growing advantage in export prices, and an upgrade in the quality of 
Chinese exports. 
To explore this question, we first construct import unit values.  We use essentially 
the same 5-digit SITC differentiated products involved in our construction of Table 3.  
We obtain the unit import values, by dividing import value for each product (i) traded 
from country k to l by corresponding quantity (weight). The data include imports of 75 
importer countries from 74 trading partners for 1,724 products (5-digit SITC Rev.3) for 
year 1995 and 1,811 products for year 2005.
20  Before examining the unit prices globally, 
we  summarize  our findings  on the behavior of the prices of  Chinese  and Japanese 
products over the decade relative to those charged by U.S. exporters in Figure 3.  To do 
so, we  take the simple average values of the import prices from China, Japan, and the 
United States across  all the importing countries in our data set.  Chinese and Japanese 
average prices are divided by corresponding prices from the United States,  and then we 
take the logarithms of the relative prices.  Figure 3 is constructed as follows.  The logs of 
the relative prices for products, i=1, 2,…, I, for country k (k = China or Japan) in year t 
are organized in ascending order.  Second, we assign the cumulative frequency 1/I to the 
product with the lowest relative price, 2/I to the product with the second lowest relative 
price,  and  I/I=1  to  the  product  with  the  highest  relative  price.    Then,  Chinese  and 
Japanese empirical cumulative distribution functions (cdf) across the 1,724 differentiated 
products are plotted for year 1995 and those across the 1,811 differentiated products are 
plotted for year 2005.  In both years of 1995 and 2005, more than 85 percent of Chinese 
products  are  cheaper  than  corresponding  U.S.  products.  In  contrast,  the  majority  of 
                                                 
20 We choose the 1,724 (1,811) products for year 1995 (2005) from 2,001 total differentiated products 
since these products have observations from each of China, Japan, or the United States.   
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Japanese exports are expensive relative to U.S. products; this relationship remains stable 
across the two years in the sample.  If a higher unit price from one country versus another 
denotes  superior  quality  (Hallak,  2006,  2010),  the  surge  in  China’s  exports  does  not 
depend on an increase product quality at least over the time period of our study, since 
there is no significant change in the distribution of relative unit prices. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Our 5-digit level unit values vary not only because of differences in underlying 
shipping prices but also because of transportation costs.  In order to get a better picture of 
the former, we use the unit value data to extract empirical proxies for f.o.b. import unit 
values  (p
kl
it)  of  each  differentiated  product  for  each  year  1995  or  2005  across  75 
importers and 75 exporters.  In particular, we assume that the measured import price of 
each product i shipped from country k to l (pi
kl) depends on several variables: the export 
price of country k (pi
k), the distance from country k to l (D
kl) which captures transport 
costs,  and  other  control  variables  for  any  exporter-importer  pairs  such  as  dummy 
variables for regional trade agreements (FTAt
kl), membership of WTO (WTOt
kl), common 
language (Language
kl), and common border (Border
kl).
21  Finally, we capture exporter 
free on board (i.e., f.o.b values) prices, averaged across importing countries for each year, 
from exporter fixed effects (
k
it  ).  We set an exporter fixed effect term for the United 
States to zero.  Thus, the remaining exporter fixed-effects estimates for each of the two 
years represent export prices relative to the United States.   
Based on the discussion above, our empirical model for import prices is given as: 
                                                 
21  We create the dummy variables for FTA and WTO using information taken from the World Trade 
Organization Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS). The dummy variables for 
common border and common language as well as bilateral distance between capital cities are obtained from 
the CEPII database.   
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(14)    1 2 3 4 5 ln( ) ln( )
kl k kl kl kl kl kl kl
it it i i t i t i i it p D FTA WTO Language Border                
Given the large number of estimates we have for each product, we do not report all the 
results.  Instead, in Table 5, we provide summary statistics for the estimated coefficients, 
the proportion of coefficients that have the expected sign, and the proportion of those that 
are significant at the 5% level.  Consider the table.  Import prices are positively related to 
the  log  of  distance  between  countries k  and  l.    97.7  (97.9)  percent  of  product-level 
estimates  have  positive  signs,  94.3  (93.6)  percent  of  them  for  year  1995  (2005)  are 
statistically significant.  On average, a 1% increase in distance causes a 0.24% (0.20%) 
increase in import price.  The FTA dummy variable is expected to be negative since 
countries  that  share  an  FTA  agreement  would  reduce  or  eliminate  commercial  trade 
barriers.  However, most of the signs on FTA dummy variable are insignificant.     
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
In addition, we report exporter fixed-effect coefficients for China and Japan ( ˆk
it  ) 
for the years 1995 and 2005.  Using 1995 data, more than 70 percent of the Chinese 
exporter fixed effect estimates are negative, and 41 percent are statistically significant. 
Using  2005  data,  these  proportions  rise  to 95.9 and  80.3 percent  respectively. These 
estimates  reinforce  the  evidence  presented  in  Figure  3;  compared  to  U.S.  exports, 
Chinese products are cheaper across most products in markets throughout the world.  One 
explanation for these price differentials is that Chinese exports may be of lower quality.  
Schott (2004) provides evidence that countries are vertically specialized in quality even 
within the same product.  While developed countries export relatively high-quality high-
value varieties, developing countries export low-quality low-price varieties.  Although 
within-product specialization is a plausible story, these price differences may be due to  
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any of a variety of other factors.  First, although in the same 5-digit category, the two sets 
of products may be fundamentally different.  Second, even though they may be the same 
type and have the same quality, Chinese products might simply be cheaper due to lower 
production costs (e.g. unit labor costs).
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To contrast the price advantage of Chinese products relative to other countries, we 
also study the coefficients on Japan relative to the United States.  Only a small fraction of 
the  Japanese  exporter  coefficients  were  negative,  and  few  of  these  estimates  were 
significantly different from zero.  Thus, to the extent that Japanese  products successfully 
compete against U.S.  products in third markets appears to be due to factors other than 
price.  On the other hand, these exporter coefficients point to price playing perhaps an 
even larger role in China’s competitive edge vis à vis Japan than it does against the 
United States. 
6.2  Export Growth at the Intensive Margin 
In the discussions above and consistent with the findings of Amiti and Freund, we 
have shown that much of Chinese export growth in the past decade or so has been at the 
intensive  margin.    That  is,  over  time  an  increasing  number  of  Chinese  firms  in  a 
particular industry have chosen to enter the export market.  In this section we provide a 
model of this decision as well as empirical estimates based on the model. 
The approach we take is based on a model developed by Helpman, Melitz, and 
Rubinstein (2008) (hereafter HMR).  Demand in each country l is obtained from a two-
tier  utility  function  of  a  representative  consumer.    The  upper  tier  of  this  function  is 
separable into sub-utilities defined for each product i = 1, …, I:  1 [ ,..., ,..., ]
l l l l
iI U U u u u  .  
                                                 
22 We explore this possibility in the next sub-section.  
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The representative consumer uses a two-stage budgeting process.  The first stage involves 
the allocation of expenditure across products.  In the second stage, we derive the demand 
for each variety ω in product i from the utility maximization problem subject to the 
optimal expenditure (Yit
l) obtained from the first stage. 
The sub-utility index ui














     .  Here, qit
l(ω) is country l’s consumption of 
variety ω in product i in time t, Bit
l is the set of varieties in product i available for country 
l at t, and the time-invariant product-specific parameter αi determines the elasticity of 
substitution across varieties so that εi =1/(1-αi)>1.  From the utility maximization problem 
of a representative consumer, we can find the demand function for each variety: 
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      
A  firm  in  country  k  produces  one  unit  of  output  with  a  cost  minimizing 
combination of inputs that costs cit
k, which is country, industry, and time specific cost for 
unit production.  1/ait
k is firm-specific productivity measure (i.e., a firm with a lower 
value of ait
k is more productive and that with a higher value of ait
k is less productive) 
whose product-specific cumulative distribution function Gi(ait
k) does not change over the 
period and has a time- and country-specific support [ , ]
kk
it it aa.   
We assume that each variety ω is produced by a firm with productivity ait
k.  If this 
producer sells in its own market, it incurs no transportation cost.  If this producer seeks to 
sell the same product in country l, it has to bear two additional costs: one is a fixed cost 
of serving country l (fit
kl) and the other is an iceberg transport cost (˄t
kl).  
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Since  the  market  is  characterized  by  monopolistic  competition,  a  producer  in 
country k with a productivity measure of ait





k/αi.  If the producer in country k produces a variety in 
product i and exports to consumers in country l, the delivery price of the product is 
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As a result, the associated operating profits from the sales to country l are 
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Since the profits are positive in the domestic market for surviving firms (Melitz, 2003), 
all Nit
k producers are profitable in home country k.  However, sales to an export market 
such as country l are positive when a firm is productive enough to cover both fixed and 
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l of varieties in product i available in country l is smaller than the total number 
of varieties produced in the world.  In addition, Gi(ait
kl) could be zero since no firm from 
country k may find it profitable to export to country l at time t. 
Equation (18) provides several possible explanations for China’s success in the 
world  market.    First,  competitive  advances,  perhaps  through  acquisition  of  foreign 
technology could lower the value of ait
k as well as the variable cost of production and 
motivate Chinese firms to enter into foreign markets.  Second, a decline in fixed costs of  
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exporting and/or transport costs would also cause the cut-off productivity level to decline, 
thus generating an increase in the number of firms entering into the export market.  On 
the demand side, an increase in Yit
l would raise the profitability of exporting across the 
board, inducing more of less-productive firms to export.   
Next, let 
(19)                                     







a k k kl k
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The demand function (15) and the pricing equation (16) then imply that the demand in 
country l for product i from country k in year t is given by: 
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1 i k kl
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1 1 ( ) /
i
i l k kl k kl
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Note that the volume of bilateral imports (mit
kl) equals zero when 
kl k
it it aa   because Vit
kl = 
0.   
We follow HMR and assume that firm productivity, 1/ait
k, is Pareto distributed. 
Thus in equation (19):   ( ) [( ) ( ) ]/[( ) ( ) ]
i i i i k k k k k
i it it it it it G a a a a a
        where κi > εi -1 and κi 
captures the shape of the distribution.  The shape of the distribution is identical for each 
product across countries but, as we defined, the supports are different for countries for 
each year to capture technological progress from the productivity of the most productive 
firm in country k (ait
k).  Then, we can further simplify Vit
kl as follows.  
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The  selection  of  firms  into  export  markets  is  summarized  in  Wit
kl,  which  is 
determined by the cut-off value of ait
kl.  This cut-off value is determined by the zero 
profit condition given by equation (18).  Let us pick the most productive firm in country k 
in producti at year t and define the latent variable Zit
kl as  
(22)                                       
11 (1 )( / ) ( )
ii l k kl l k
kl i it i it it it it
it kl
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This is the ratio of variable export profits for the most productive firm to the fixed export 
cost for exporting from k to l.  Positive exports are observed if and only if Zit
kl>1.  In 
addition, Wit
kl is a monotonic function of Zit
kl; 
( 1)/( 1) ( ) 1
i i i kl kl
it it WZ
       .   
Let  exp( )
kl l k kl kl
it it it it it it fe          where eit
kl is random variable, ˆit
l is a fixed 
trade barrier for product i imposed by the importing country on all exporters in year t, ˆit
k 
is  a  measure  of  fixed  export  costs  common  across  all  export  destinations,  ˆit
kl  is  an 
observed measure of any additional country pair specific fixed trade costs.  Using this 
specification together with (εi -1)ln(τit
kl)
 =  γitd
kl - uit
kl  where d
kl is the log of distance 
between countries k and l and uit
kl is a random error, the latent variable zit
kl = ln(Zit
kl) can 
be expressed as 
(23)                                         
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kl  is  random  error;  βit
k  is  an  exporter  fixed  effect  that  captures  (1-
εi)ln(cit
k),  (1-εi)ln(ait
k),  and  ˆit
k;  βit
l  is  an  importer  fixed  effect  that




l; and the remaining variables in equation (22) are constant for 
product i for year t (βit).   
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Now, define the indicator variable Tit
kl to be 1 when country k exports product i to 
country l in year t and 0 when it does not.  Let ρit
kl be the probability that product i of 
country k exports to country l conditional on the observed variables.  We can specify the 
following Probit equation: 
(24)                                     
Pr( 1| , , , , )
()
kl kl k l kl kl
it it it it it t
k l kl kl kl
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where Φ is the cdf of the unit-normal distribution.  Let  ˆ
kl
it   be the predicted probability of 
exports of product i from country k to l in year t, and let 
1 ˆ ˆ ()
kl kl
it it z 
  be the predicted 
value of the latent variable.  Then, an estimate for Wit
kl is obtained from  
(25)                                       
( 1)/( 1) max ( ) 1,0
i i i kl kl
it it WZ
       .
 
To  estimate  equation  (24)  for  each  product  for  each  year  (1995  or  2005),  we 
employ data on bilateral trade across 81 countries (6,480 country pairs) for 144 3-digit 
differentiated products.
23  We prepare the following bilateral indexes for the estimation of 
equation  (24):  dummy  variables  for  regional  trade  agreements  ( FTAt
kl),  common 
language (Language
kl), common border (Border
kl), and colonial ties (Colony
kl).
24  The 
dummy variables for  the degree of bilateral legal strength (Legal
kl), business start-up 
costs (Startup
kl), and new business registration costs (Register
kl) are developed from the 
                                                 
23 We use trade measured at the 3-digit level due to the enormous number of zero trade observations at 
further levels of disaggregation.  See footnote 7 for the 81 countries in our sample. Since some countries do 
not report 3-digit level import data for years 1995 and 2000, we use data from the closest available years. 
This includes: Brunei 1997; Fiji 2000; Sri Lanka 1999; Benin 1998; Gabon 1996; Ghana 1996; Guinea-
Bissau 2003; Mali 1996; Nigeria 1996; Senegal 1996; UAE 1996. For year 2005, we use 2003 data for 
Brunei and 2006 for Nigeria.   
24  We create the FTA variable using information taken from the World Trade Organization Regional 
Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS). The dummy variables for distance, common border, 
common language and colonial relationship are obtained from the CEPII website.   
  28 
World Bank Development Indicators.
25  In the data the higher the value of the legal rights 
index indicates a stronger legal system in that country.  We set Legal
kl equal to one if the 
sum of the legal rights indices of the two countries is greater than the sample median.  
We set Startup
kl equal to one if the sum of the business start-up costs in the two countries 
is greater than the median value.  Finally, Register
kl is one if the sum of the number of 
procedures required to register a new business in the two countries is less than the median 
value.   
We report the estimation results of equation (24) for each of the 144 differentiated 
products in Table 6.  For each product, we have at most 6,480 observations.  The median 
value of observations is 5,920, of which 3,881 are zeros in year 1995.  Although we have 
6,480  observations  for  each  product,  we  have  to  drop  the  observations  if  a  country 
exports to all 80 trading partners, imports from all 80 countries, or does not export or 
import  the  product  at  all.    For  example,  Japan  exports  passenger  vehicles  to  all  80 
countries in both years 1995 and 2005.  In this case, we cannot estimate the probability of 
exports for Japanese auto industry since the observed probability is 100%.  Given the 
large number of estimates we have for each product, we do not report all the results.  
Instead, in the table we provide summary statistics for the estimated coefficients, the 
proportion of coefficients that have the expected sign, and the proportion of those that are 
significant at the 5% level. 
        [Insert Table 6 about here]   
Consider the table.  The probability of successful exports from country k to l (ρit
kl) 
is negatively related to the log of distance between them.  100 percent of industry-level 
                                                 
25 The World Bank Development Indicators data set does not include information on any of these three 
series for 1995.  Consequently, in our empirical work we use 2005 data for both years.     
  29 
estimates have negative signs and are statistically significant for both 1995 and 2005.  
Estimated  coefficients  on  FTA  dummy  variables  are  expected  to  be  positive  since 
countries involved in an FTA share lower trade barriers.  As expected, most of the signs 
are positive: 76.4 percent for year 1995 and 85.0 percent for year 2005; however, more 
than  half  of  them  are  statistically  insignificant  at  the  5%  level.    Interestingly,  some 
business-related variables provide strong support for the  model.  The probabilities of 
positive trade among the country pairs with relatively strong legal systems (Legal
kl) and 
those with fewer procedures to register new businesses (Register
kl) are higher.  Finally, 
for  each  year  more  than  60  percent  of  the  coefficients  on  our  proxy  for  the  cost  of 
business  start  ups  (Startup
kl)  carry  the  expected  negative  sign,  most  of  them  are 
statistically insignificant.   
As  we  did  for  our  estimates  of  export  prices,  we  report  exporter-specific 
coefficients for China and Japan ( ˆk
it  ) for years 1995 and 2005.  As before, we set the 
exporter-specific fixed effect variable for the United States to zero for each product and 
year.  Thus, the reported values in Table 6 for China and Japan are relative to the United 
States.  Using 1995 data, China’s probabilities of successful exports are lower than the 
United States for 82.9 percent of the 140 products in the sample, and 53.6 percent are 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  This pattern reversed over the period we consider.  
Using 2005 data, China’s probabilities of exporting are higher than the United States for 
78.6 percent of the 140 products; 49.3 percent of them are statistically significant at the 
5% level.  Finally, in contrast to the case of China, there is virtually no change in the sign 
pattern for Japanese exporter fixed effects over the period: 72.9 percent in 1995 and 73.6 
percent in 2005 carry negative signs.   
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We  can  use  the  estimated  coefficients  from  our  model  to  illustrate  how  the 
probabilities  of  successful  exports  of  various  product  types  by  exporters  in  various 
countries have changed over time.  As an example we consider two products, Sound 
Recorders (SITC 96) and Footwear (SITC 126).  We construct the predicted probability 
of exports (the values of ˆ
kl
it   from equation (24)) from China, Japan, and the Philippines 
to each of the 80 trading partners for years 1995 and 2005.
26    Figure 4-1 provides the 
case of  Sound Recorders.  While Japanese probabilities of exporting  were uniformly 
higher in 1995 (Japanese probabilities first-order dominate Chinese ones), that situation 
had reversed by 2005.  Figure 4-2 shows the results for Footwear.  While the Philippine 
probabilities did not change much over time, Chinese probabilities  shifted out, indicating 
that Chinese export probabilities had increased all over the world. 
According to our theoretical model, more firms will choose to enter an export 
market over time if they are increasingly able to achieve a necessary productivity cut-off 
level.  As we discussed above, this could be due to any of a number of factors including 
rising standards of living throughout the world, technological advances in transportation 
technology, or country specific advances in production technology at the industry level.  
While our empirical model does not allow us to identify which of these factors may be 
paramount in explaining export success, it is possible to use it to estimate the product 
level cutoff productivity levels necessary to insure participation in a particular export 
                                                 
26 The choice of Japan and the Philippines for this example is due to the geographical issues.  Since the 
results in Table 6 imply that distance is a significant indicator of export success, we chose countries 
geographically close to China to try to control for this effect.  
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market.
27  Remember that  ˆ
kl
it   is the predicted probability of exports of product i from 
country k to l in year t, using the estimates from (24).  Let 
1 ˆ ˆ ()
kl kl
it it z 
  be the predicted 
value  of  the  latent  variable.    Then,  a n  estimate  for  Wit
kl  is  obtained  from 
( 1)/( 1) ( ) 1
i i i kl kl
it it WZ




i are constant 
over time, we can use equation (21) to show the relationship between our estimates of the 
latent variable and the cut-off point of productivity for each product :
 
(26)                                                       ˆˆ ˆ ( 1)ln( / )
kl kl k
it i it it z a a    
where we have at most 11,200 observations (140 products for 80 importer countries) for 
each exporting country k for each year 1995 or 2005.   
Figures 5-1 through 5-3 provide scatter plots of the cut-off relative productivity of 
product i for importing country l (equation (26)) for year 1995 against that for year 2005 
for three exporting countries: the United States, Japan, and China, respectively.  We have 
11,131  cut-off  productivities  for  the  United  States,  11,030  for  Japan,  and  11,110  for 
China.  Interestingly, there are no significant changes over the period we consider for the 
United  States  and  Japan.  In  each  case  the  plots  are  distributed  along  the  45
o  line. 
According to our model, this suggests that the number of firms in these two countries 
choosing  to  export  remained  essentially  constant  between  1995  and  2005.    This  is 
because there was no change of the cut-off points of productivities to entry into export 
markets, i.e. the ait
kl relative to the productivity levels of the most efficient firms (ait
k).  
Coupled with our findings on export price patterns, our results indicate relatively static 
conditions for American and Japanese exports. 
                                                 
27 Note, however, that given the across the board growth of Chinese exports relative to the exports of other 
countries, demand conditions and transport cost technology (which would have impacted all potential 
entrants) probably were not as important as technological innovations in China.   
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        [Insert Figures 5-1 to 5-3 about here] 
In contrast, it is interesting to observe an across the board shift in productivity cut-
off points for Chinese exporters.  In virtually all cases the observations in Figure 5-3 lie 
above  the  45
o  line.  Since  the  cut-off  points  relative  to  the  most  productive  firm’s 
productivity have declined, our model suggests that the number of Chinese firms with the 
capacity to successfully export to foreign markets has increased dramatically and these 
increases have been across virtually all products and in virtually all markets in our sample. 
7. Conclusions 
  The growth of Chinese exports both in volume and in market share over the past 
two decades is a singular event in the history of world trade.  Using data from 1995-2005, 
we document this growth in a variety of ways.  First, we show that the expanded trade is 
pervasive.  Virtually every country in the world has seen China claim a larger share of its 
import  market.    Then,  we  use  CMS  analysis  to  try  to  determine  which  country  or 
countries  have  lost  market  share  as  China’s  trade  has  grown.    Contrary  to  much 
discussion in the popular press, we find strong evidence that other developing countries 
have not seen export shares fall as a result of China’s gains.  Rather, our results suggest 
that China’s share growth has come largely at the expense of exporters based in Japan 
and the United States.  In this paper, we cannot identify the central reason why these two 
countries  lost  market  shares  to  China.    We  do  find  strong  evidence  of  productivity 
advances across virtually all industrial sectors in China.  This suggests a strong impetus 
for more Chinese firms to enter the export market.  
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Table 1. China's National Export Market Share by Region
Average Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum Average Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum
Africa 22 7.4 8.3 39.1 1.6 5.0 7.8 36.4 -1.0
Asia 16 12.8 9.8 45.0 3.2 6.5 3.2 10.6 0.4
Europe 17 4.1 1.8 8.8 1.2 2.6 1.6 7.4 0.3
Middle East 7 5.5 2.9 9.9 2.3 3.1 1.7 5.8 1.0
North America 3 8.4 6.2 13.0 2.7 5.4 3.4 8.7 2.0
South America 16 5.2 2.2 9.3 2.2 4.2 2.0 9.3 1.5
Total 81 7.2 7.0 45.0 1.2 4.5 4.6 36.4 -1.0
Countries




 Table 2. Structure of Chinese Exports
I. Commodity Structure of Chinese Exports II. China's shares in world exports
SITC Rev 3 Commodities All countries Developing countries (China's exports/World exports)
1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005
0 Food and live animals 6.6 3.0 5.4 2.2 3.2 4.8
1 Beverages and tobacco 0.8 0.1 1.6 0.3 2.3 1.6
2 Crude materials 2.9 1.0 2.1 0.5 2.6 3.5
3 Mineral fuels 3.6 2.1 2.3 2.4 1.6 1.2
4 Animal and vegetable oils 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.0 1.2 0.8
5 Chemicals and related products 6.0 4.5 6.3 5.5 2.0 3.6
6 Manufactured goods (materials) 21.2 16.0 26.9 18.1 5.0 11.1
7 Machinery and transport equipment 21.4 47.8 23.8 51.7 3.1 13.1
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 37.0 25.2 30.3 18.9 17.9 28.2
9 Other commodities 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.8 2.0
Notes : We use Chinese export data for panel I. We use 74 countries' imports from China and total for panel II. 
           Benin, Gabon, Ghana, Mali,  Senegal, and Guyana are excluded in panel II for 1995.    
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Table 3. Export Market Share Change Decomposition: Selected Countries (1995-2005)
Fagerberg and Sollie Decomposition (2,001 SITC 5-digit Products)
Market Commodity Commodity Market Market Total Change
Share Composition Adaptation Composition Adaptation in Share
Africa 0.045 -0.065 0.033 -0.017 0.001 -0.002
Ghana -0.007 -0.007 0.006 0.000 0.000 -0.008
Kenya 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Asia and Pacific 5.192 -2.167 2.246 0.680 0.465 6.417
Australia 0.029 0.045 -0.043 -0.014 -0.012 0.004
China 9.563 -0.659 0.657 -0.468 0.331 9.423
Indonesia 0.301 -0.062 -0.066 0.001 -0.058 0.117
Japan -4.449 -0.709 0.246 0.826 -0.174 -4.259
South Korea -0.247 -0.650 1.040 0.237 0.434 0.814
Malaysia 0.228 -0.113 0.139 -0.145 0.155 0.265
Philippines 0.278 0.087 0.209 -0.041 0.078 0.612
India 0.402 -0.040 0.000 -0.032 0.007 0.337
Thailand 0.288 0.032 -0.059 -0.076 0.031 0.217
Europe -2.612 0.073 -0.554 -1.169 -0.204 -4.466
France -0.660 -0.079 0.108 -0.089 -0.011 -0.732
Germany -0.306 -0.473 -0.262 -0.185 -0.087 -1.312
Italy -0.459 -0.467 -0.205 -0.094 -0.043 -1.269
Spain 0.283 -0.079 0.101 -0.077 -0.055 0.172
United Kingdom -0.967 0.551 -0.468 -0.099 0.008 -0.975
Middle East 0.428 0.040 -0.065 0.004 0.004 0.412
North America -3.689 1.684 -0.925 0.569 -0.282 -2.643
Canada -0.344 0.306 -0.292 0.244 -0.058 -0.144
Mexico 0.527 0.046 0.112 0.122 0.026 0.834
USA -3.871 1.331 -0.744 0.203 -0.250 -3.333
South America 0.337 -0.071 0.070 -0.068 0.015 0.282
Argentina -0.001 -0.075 0.048 -0.037 0.011 -0.054
Brazil 0.198 0.013 0.034 -0.033 -0.018 0.194
Note: Fiji (2000-2005), Sri Lanka (1999-2005), Brunei (1997-2003), Guinea-Bissau (2003-2005),
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Figure 2-6. Share Changes between China and India  in 3rd Markets
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Table 4. Changes in Export Shares of China, Japan, and USA in Regional Markets (1995-2005)
North America Europe Asia&Pacific Others Total
I. Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 3, Industry 7)
China 12.5 6.9 16.0 7.2 11.4
Japan -10.0 -3.4 -9.4 -1.5 -6.6
USA -3.0 -3.0 -8.1 -8.3 -4.7
Developed (exclude Japan and USA) -4.0 -3.1 -4.2 -1.3 -4.5
Developing (exclude China) 4.5 2.6 5.8 3.9 4.4
II. Miscellaneous manufactured articles (SITC 3, Industry 8)
China 15.5 11.0 4.1 14.8 11.0
Japan -3.8 -1.4 0.1 -2.0 -1.7
USA -3.4 -1.2 -3.7 -8.7 -2.8
Developed (exclude Japan and USA) -4.4 -7.0 1.1 -4.9 -5.0
Developing (exclude China) -3.9 -1.5 -1.6 0.7 -1.5
III. Other industries (SITC 3, Industries 0-6, and 9)
China 3.5 1.4 2.3 3.5 2.4
Japan -2.4 -0.2 -1.6 -1.1 -1.1
USA -3.5 -0.4 -7.5 -4.7 -2.9
Developed (exclude Japan and USA) -1.1 -1.5 4.2 -5.2 -1.7
Developing (exclude China) 3.5 0.7 2.6 7.5 3.3
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80 Trading Partners (ordered from lowest to highest probability)






Table 5. Import Price Estimates 
Expected  Sign match  Sign match & 
 signs   (%)  5% significance 
Year: 1995 
Coefficients 
log(  distance 
kl  )  +  97.7  94.3  0.244  0.949  -0.158  0.124 
FTA  t 
kl  -  18.9  6.5  0.273  3.552  -1.985  0.402 
WTO  t 
kl  -  14.6  2.7  0.394  8.682  -2.977  0.550 
Border 
kl  -  34.7  9.2  0.093  2.884  -3.606  0.327 
Language 
kl  -  79.4  30.9  -0.141  0.649  -1.493  0.214 
China Dummy  -  70.9  41.0  -0.450  5.515  -7.742  0.908 
Japan Dummy  -  21.7  3.5  0.341  2.881  -2.229  0.494 
Observations  469  1813  36  280 
Adjusted R squares  0.190  0.612  -0.241  0.090 
Year: 2005 
Coefficients 
log(  distance 
kl  )  +  97.9  93.6  0.201  0.889  -0.977  0.111 
FTA  t 
kl  -  12.3  1.6  0.204  2.629  -7.035  0.299 
WTO  t 
kl  -  11.9  2.4  0.670  11.089  -2.943  0.878 
Border 
kl  -  25.2  7.6  0.182  2.176  -2.690  0.350 
Language 
kl  -  78.3  33.1  -0.115  1.393  -2.877  0.215 
China Dummy  -  95.9  80.3  -0.815  2.909  -4.781  0.543 
Japan Dummy  -  28.1  5.0  0.230  2.533  -3.295  0.481 
Observations  798  2898  16  502 
Adjusted R squares  0.131  0.918  -0.271  0.084 
Notes  : (1) 1,720 products for year 1995 and 1,809 products for year 2005 are estimated from OLS with robust standard errors. 
      (2) Fiji, Sri Lanka, Brunei, Guinea-Bissau, UAE, and Nigeria are excluded from 81 countries. 
St. Dev  Median  Max  Min  
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Figure 5-1 Ratio of the Most Efficient to Export Cut-off  Productivities (USA)
  

























































Figure 5-3 Ratio of the Most Efficient to Export Cut-off  Productivities (China)
 